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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART T

-----------------------------------------------------------------x
BRONX PARK PHASE II PRESERVATION, LLC,
L&T Index No.
60327/16

Petitioner,
-against-

Motion Seq. No. 13

v.c.
DECISION/ORDER
Respondent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------x
Present:
Hon. HOWARD BAUM
Judge, Housing Court
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in tl1e review of the motion
by Respondent V.C.:

Papers

Numbered

Notice of motion ru1d Affirn1ation in Support............................... _1_

Affir1nation in Opposition with Exhibit annexed............................ _2_
Affinnation and Affidavits in Reply ......... , ............... ,.................. _3_
E-mail submission of Tamra Pelleman, Esq., in Opposition, dated
March 8, 2021, Affidavit of Francisco Lopez, sworn to on March 5,
2021 with Exhibit I and Affidavit ofMicl1ael Healey, sworn to on
March 5, 2021..... .. ....... .. .. . .. ... ..... ... ... . ... ... .... .. ... .. ................
E-mail submission of Adam Shoop, Esq., in Support, dated March 8,
2021 ................................................................................
E-mail submission of Tamra Pelleman, Esq., in Opposition, dated
March 15, 2021 and Affidavit of Robert Bogart, sworn to on March 15,
2021 with Exhibit 1.. .............................................................
Post-Argument Men1orandttrn of Law in Response to Petitioner's
Affidavits Opposing Stay........................................................

_4_
_5_

__§__

_]__

After oral argun1ent and upon the foregoing cited papers, the decisio11 and order on this
motion is as follows:
This is a summary l1oldover eviction proceeding commenced by Petitioner Bro11x Park
Phase II Preservation, LLC ("Petitioner") against V.C. ("Respondent"). Petitioner seeks
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Respondent's eviction from the apartment that is the subject of this proceeding based on its
allegations, contained in a notice to cme and notice to terminate annexed to the petition, t11at
Respondent is violating a substantial obligation of his tenancy and permitting and/or committing
a nuisance. Petitioner alleges Respondent has been "loitering throughout the building at all
hours of the day and night on almost a daily basis yelling, screaming banging and poundi11g;" he
has been "1nakiI1g i11appropriate comments to other tenants ... deemed to be sexually harassing
and/or discriminates [sic] toward other tenants;" he has sent "notes and letters to other
tenants ... deemed to be inappropriate;" 1 has made "numerous unfounded complaints about other
neighboring tenants claiming" they were harassing him "when in fact [he] is harassing an·d
distmbing them;" he has been "observed banging on another tenant's door so hard that [l1e]
damaged the apartment door" requiring [Petitioner] to replace it; and he has been observed
re1noving door knobs "fron1 the emergency exit [sic] througl1out the building" forcing
[Petitioner] to replace the door knobs. Further, the notice to terminate alleges that Respondent
was observed on video "attempting to break into and enter another tenant's apartment. .. [and
removing] the te11ant's door knob" and that he was arrested by the New York Police Department
and charged witl1 various crimes.
Respondent 11as answered. He has denied the allegations in the predicate notices, raised
objections in point of law as to Petitioner's failure to state a cause of action and raised
affirn1ative defenses related to his having cured and his entitlement to a reasonable
accomn1odation pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the

1

Language from these alleged notes, w11ich Petitioner asse1ts Respondent has ad1nitted sending,
is included in the predicate notices.
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Americans with Disabilities Act and related state and local laws. Respondent has also
counterclaimed for attorney's fees.
'fhis proceeding has been on the court's calendar for aln1ost five years. There has been
extensive niotion practice dttri11g the proceeding. Most recently, a trial in the proceeding was
scl1eduled for March 17, 2020 but before reaching that date, the court reduced its calendars due
to the onset of the COVID-19' pandemic and the trial was delayed.
In the motion currently before the cou11, Respondent seeks an order stayi11g the tr·ial
and/or granting a reasonable accommo-dation2 to Ilespondent, the guardian ad !item ("GAL")
who has been assig11ed to assist Respondent in this proceeding and Respondent's counsel in
regard to the conduct of the trial. Respondent argues that he, his GAL and his attorney all suffer
fro1n "medical vulnerabilities" to COVID-19 and as a result should not be required to appear in
court for an in-person trial in this proceeding and risk being exposed to the virus. Further,
Responde11t argues that conducting a virtual trial would deprive him of a "meaningful
and ... equally effective access to a fair trial." As a result, Respondent argues 11e must be granted
a reasonable accon1modation and the trial must be stayed. 3 Additionally, Respondent argues the
trial should be stayed pursuant to the COVID-19 Einergency Eviction and Foreclosure

2

Respondent argues he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the Americans
witl1 Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the New York State Human Rights Law
and the New York City Human Rights Law.

3

Respondent's motion is denied, as moot, to the extent it seeks a stay of the trial, pursuant to
CPLR 2201, on Fifth Amendment grounds and because criminal charges are pending against hin1
for alleged acts that are part of the underlying claims against him in this proceeding. Respondent
has acknowledged he has entered a plea in relation to those criminal charges since he filed this
n1otion.
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Prevention Act of2020 ("CEEFPA") (L. 2020, ch. 381) based on his submission ofa hardship
declaration. 4

Petitioner opposes the 111otion. It argues Respondent should be denied a stay of the trial
and/or a reasonable accommodation in that he has not provided an affidavit from anyone with

perso11al knowledge of issues related to the alleged inedical conditions that would jt1stify
granting l1im a reasonable accommodation. Further, Petitioner argues CEEFPA does not stay a
trial based on the factual circumstances presented here. Petitioner asserts affidavits that l1ave
bee11 submitted stating Respondent continues to act in a manner that poses a danger to otl1er
tenants in the building places this proceeding within. the category of cases CEEFPA specifically

exempts from a stay of the proceeding moving forward. 5

Discussion
Respondent's motion is granted solely to the extent a virtual trial will be held in t11is
proceeding. Altl1ougl1 Respondent has not provided medical documentation de1nonstrating a
disability in support ofl1is request for a reasonable accommodation, affidavits submitted by

4

Issues related to tl1e applicability of tl1e stay provisions in tl1e CEEFPA were not raised in the
initial motion papers filed by· Respondent. However, considering the law was not enacted until
after the initial 1notion papers were filed, the court has permitted the parties to address issues
raised by the statute in papers filed in opposition to the motion, in reply to the opposition, in
supplemental pap~rs and e-mails in support and opposition to the motion and at oral argument 011
t11e motion.
5

Petitioner's additional argu1nent, t11at this motion is untimely based on a stipulation of
settlement, dated April 11, 2018, in which the parties agreed to a trial date of May 21, 2018 and
that any pre-trial motions were reqt1ired to be filed by May 21, 2018, over two and a half years
before this motion was filed, lacks merit. The issues in this motion, that are 11ot moot, arise from
the COVID-19 pandemic which could not have been foreseen by the parties when they agreed to
the terms of the April 11, 2018 stipulation.
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Respondent and the GAL assigned to assist him in this proceeding attest to their vulnerability to
severe illness if they become infected with COVID-19 ..Respondent states he suffers from
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease ("COPD") and that he is 68 years old. His GAL states
she is over 65 years old. 6
In any case, currently all bench trials and hearings in Housing Cou11 are conducted
virtually tmless the respective Deputy Chief Administrative Judge permits otherwise. 7 Tl1is court
possesses the authority to devise and make new processes and forms of proceedings, necessary to
carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it. Judiciary Law § 2-b(3). The "Court
of Appeals and the Appellate Division, First Department, have repeatedly held that one such
procedure that courts may employ, albeit in exceptional circumstances,, is the use of video
testimony ... " Ciccone v. One W. 64th St., Inc., 69 Misc 3d 585 (Sup Ct NY County 2020), citing
People v. Wrotten, 14 NY3d 33 (2009); Wynona Apts. LLCv. Ran1irez, 70 Misc 3d 591 (Civ Ct
Kings County 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic and the dangers it poses to litigants and witnesses who would
be required to come into the courthouse for an in-person trial constitutes an exceptional
circumstance that justifies a vi11ual be11ch trial in this proceeding. Bonilla v. ,')fate, 71 Misc 3d
235 (Ct of Claims 2021); C.C. v. A.R., 69 Misc 3d 983 (Sup Ct Kings County 2020); Ciccone v.
One W. 64/h St., Inc., 69 Misc 3d 585 (Sup Ct NY County 2020); Wynona Apts. LLC v. Ramirez,

70 Misc 3d 591 (Civ Ct Kings County 2020); In re Kevin M v. Alexander C., 2020 WL 7975941

6

Although the 1notion also argues the attorney re_presenting Respondent is in a higl1-risk group
for severe illness if he is infected with COVID-19, that attorney is not currently handling
Respondent's case.
7

See, November 13, 2020 1 Memorru1dum of Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks.
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(Fam Ct Nassau Com1ty 2020). Even now, more than a year into the pandemic, it has not been
declared safe for courts to resume full in-person operations. Although a rising percentage of the
adult population has received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, given the unpredictable
i1ature of the COVID-19 pandemic and persistently 11igh infection rate8 it is unknown when the
court's operations will return to normal procedures with all litigants appearing ii1-person

(Bonilla v. State, 71Misc3d 235 [Ct of Claims 2021]). Accordingly, it is necessary for the trial
in this proceeding to be held virtually.
Respondent himself acknowledges that holding a virtual trial is clearly "the 'reasonable'
option. " 9 However, his argument that conducting a virtual trial is not compatible with his right to
due process is unavailing. Although there may be circumstances in wl1icl1 conducting a virtual
bench trial is inappropriate, t11e arguments provided by Respondent as to why a virtual trial
should i1ot be held in this proceeding are not persuasive.
Responde11t argues the court will be unable to make credibility assessments of the
witnesses if a virtual trial is held and the court will be unable to verify witnesses are testifying
fTom memory and not reading fron1 documents. Wit11 advances in video confere11cing
teclmology t11e parties and the court are able to participate in a virtual trial with high image
quality using readily available computer programs. Utilizing t11ese programs, the court and the
parties will be able to assess each witness' demeanor and credibility by observing them directly
on a screen. C. C. v. A.R., 69 Misc 3d 983 (Sup Ct Kings County 2020); Ciccone v. One W 64th

8 According

to the tracking of the coronavirus done by The Ne-w York Times, as of May 5, 2021,
New York City rernai11s at a "very high risk" level for exposure to COVID-19.
9

Affir1nation in support ofmotio11 by Steven Hasty, para. 54.
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St., Inc., 69 Misc 3d 585 (Sup Ct NY County 2020). Further, the court will be able discern ifa
witness is reading from docun1ents while testifying or testifying from memory.
Respondent also argues that dealing with photo and video evidence will be challenging in
a virtual trial. However, the parties will not be prevented from presenting these forms of
evidence at a virtual bench trial. The Microsoft Teams platform utilized by the cou1t, including
its screen shariI1g capacity, allows for a party to prese11t documentary and visual evidence at
trials and for all the parties involved in the trial to view the exhibit. Wyona Apt. LLC v. Ramirez,
70 Misc 3d 591 (Civ Ct Kings County 2020).
Further, Respondent argues he will not be able i:o communicate confidentially with his

attorney during a virtual trial ii1 that there "is no breakout room function in Skype for Business,"
and he will not be permitted to communicate his impressions to his attorney "in real time." These
arguments are inisplaced. The court is no longer utilizing Skype for Business as the program to
conduct virtual trials. Microsoft Teams is being used which pe1mits "breakout rooms."
Moreover, Respondent and his attorney are not barred by this order from participating in
the trial fro1n the same location and sitting near each other as they would in the courtroom if that
is what they choose to do. 10 Even if they are not at the same location for tl1e trial, Respondents
and their atto1ney 1nay use other means of communicating with each other, such as various forms
of messaging tl1at are readily available, and they may seek, at the court's discretion, a break in
the trial to have a chance to speak with each other. Respondents have not provided any autp_ority

io The court is aware of many law offices that have their clients (parties in a proceeding)
participate in a trial from tl1eir office, either in the same room where the attorney is participating
or in a nearby room. This arrangement assures the quality of the equipment to be used by the
party to participate in the trial and the ability of the attorney and party to commu11icate with each
other.
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establishi11g it would be a constitutional infirmity if they must communicate with each other by a
means other than talking while the court is hearing tl1e presentation of evidence.
Additionally, Respondent's assertion that he describes himself as "not being computer
literate" is not a basis to stay the trial until it can be conducted in-person. Participation in a
virtual trial on the Microsoft Teams program involves little more than tl1e clicking of a tab in an
e-mail that will be sent to everyone who will be participating in tl1e trial. If Respondent is unable
to perform that task or he has a conce1n about the reliability ofl1is internet connectivity, as
mentioned above, his attorney n1ay arrange for him to participate in the trial at their offices. In
the alternative, for litigants wl10 are otherwise t1nable to participate in court proceedings by
video, the court provides a kiosk in the courthouse equipped wit11 a co1nputer, at which COVID-

19 safety measures are followed, where participants can participate in video conferences and
virtual trials.
Under these circwnstances, where an adequate alternative to an in-person trial is
available to -the parties, and this proceeding is based on Petitioner's assertion that Respondent is
causing a nuisance at the pren1ises with allegations that he is endangering dther tenants at the
premises with by acts and threats of physical violence, it is inappropriate for the court to stay the
bench trial in this proceeding indefinitely, as Respondent requests, until such ti1ne that it is
recognized as safe to resume in-person trials. C'iccone v. One W. 64th St., Inc., 69 Misc 3d 585
(Sup Ct NY County 2020); A.S. v. NS., 68 Misc 3d 767 (Sup Ct NY County 2020); Perez v.

1857 Walton Realty Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 50270(U) (Civ Ct Bronx County).
Even if Respondent is entitled to a reasonable accom1nodation, he has provided no legal
authority for his position that conducting a vi1tual trial is not a sufficient reasonable
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accommodation ru1d that instead the court's only recourse is to indefinitely stay the.trial. Title II
of the American with Disabilities Act, one of the statues cited to by Respondent in support of his
nlotion, does i1ot require an indefinite stay of this proceeding. "Title II ... requires only
'reasonable modificatio11s' that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service
provided.,." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 US 509, 531 (2004). Under this

standard~

conducting the

trial in. this proceedi11g virtually constitutes the type of reasonable accommodation contemplated

by the law.
Additionally, Respondent asserts this pro.ceeding is stayed by CEEFPA because he has
submitted a hardsl1ip declaration. The legislative intent ofCEEFPA is "to avoid as many
evictions ... as possible for people experiencing a financial hardship during the COVID-19
pandemic or who cannot move due to an increased risk of severe illness or death from COVID19." CEEFPA, § 3. To acl1ieve tl1is legislative intent, CEEFPA placed an ii1itial stay of 60 days,
from the effective date of the statute (December 28, 2020), on all eviction proceedings,
regardless oftl1eir procedural posture, to give tenants in those proceedings threatened with
eviction an opportWlity to receive and file a hardship declaration, the language of which is stated
in the statute. CEEFPA, Part A, § 2.

After the passage of these 60 days, CEEPA provides an additional stay of an eviction
proceedi11g in wl1ich a warrru1t of eviction has not yet been issued (CEEFPA, Part A, § 6, as
amended), or on the execution of a warrant of eviction if the warrant has already been issued
(CEEFPA, Part A, § 8, as ame11ded), through August 31, 2021, if the tenant provides a hardship
declaration to the petitioner in the eviction proceeding, the petitioner's agent or the court.
CEEFPA does not provide a mechanism for a landlord to challenge the assertions made by a
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tenant in a hardship declaration. Thus, the stays authorized by CEEFPA are invoked with a
tenant merely p:roviding the petitioner, the petitioner's agent or the court with a hardship
declaration. CEEFPA, Part A, § 6.
However, CEEFPA carves out an exception to any stays of an eviction proceeding, even
where a tenant has provided a hardship declaration, if the "tenant is persistently and
unreasonably engaging in behavior that substantially infringes on the use and enjoyment of other
tenants or occupants or causes a substantial safety hazard to others ... " CEEFPA, Part A,§ 9.
Respondent argues this exception to the invocation of a stay of this proceeding does not
apply in this proceeding because section 9 of CEEFPA, Part A, which states the exception, does
not specifically state the procedure by which Petitioner can establish that he is engaging in
behavior proscribed by tl1e statute - endangering the safety of others tenants - where, as here, a
judgment has not already been entered against him. In making this argument Respondent draws a
contrast with proceedings where a judgment has already been issued. For proceedings in that
procedltral posture, CEEFPA specifically states a hearing shall be held to "determine whether the
tenant is continuing to persist in engaging in unreasonable behavior that substantially infTinges
on the use and enjoyment of otl1er tenants or occupants or causes a substantial safety hazard to
others." CEEFPA, Part A, § 9(2). Therefore, Respondent argues, considering CEEFPA does not
specifically state how to proceed in a- case in which a judgment has not yet been entered, the
statute stays proceedings in that procedural posture after the tenaht provides a 11ardship
declaratio11. Also, Respondent argues that without a procedure for moving forward in prejudgment cases, Petitioner is left with inere allegations of Respondent's objectionable conduct
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which, according to the language of the statute, "shall not be sufficient evidence to establish that
[Respondent] has engaged i11 ... behavior [endangering other tenants]." CEEFPA, Part A, § 9(3).
Petitioner disputes that a stay pursuant to CEEFPA is applicable considering the factual
circwnstances that for1n the basis of this proceeding. Moreover, Petitioner has provided
affidavits fro1n 2 tenants and a security officer at the premises alleging Respondent continues to
engage in behavior endangering tl1e health and safety of other tenants at the building. 011e tenant
avers in his affidavit that he was awoken at 3:58 a.m. on February 26, 2021 by Respondent
loudly bangiI1g on his door witl1 a hammer and that Respondent has been trying to "break into
[his] apartment with a hammer for years." 11 The second tenant states in an affidavit, that he has
an "active order of protection against [Respondent]," that on four separate days in February 2021
and one day in March 2021 Respondent has attempted to break into his home, and that he fears
for his life as well as his family's. The security officer's affidavit states that he reviewed
security camera fo'otage at the premises which confirmed Respondent was trying to break into
t11e first tenant's apartment on February 26th.
In detennining the application ofCEEFPA to these circumstances, the court's primary
co11sideration is to give effect to the intention of the legislature and the clearest indicator of that
intent is the text of the statute guided by the principle that a statute must be construed as a whole
and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to eacl1 other. Tov.1n

ofAurora v. Village o,f East Aurora, 32 NY3d 366 (2018); Neiv York_ C~ounty Lal-vyers' Ass'n v.
Bloo1nberg, 19 NY3d 712 (2012). In doing so, a court must give the statute a sensible and

11

'fhis affidavit is accompanied by still photos taken from video footage of a n1a11 the te11ant
identified as Respondent holding a l1ammer kicking an apartment door.
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practical over-all construction which furthers its scheme and purpose, and which harmonizes all
its interlocking provisions. In re Jamie J., 30 NY3d 275 (2017); Long v. Adirondack Park

Agency, 76 NY2d 416 (1990); Ryder v City a/New York, 32 AD3d 836 (2d 2006),
Applying a sensible and practical over-all construction to CEEFPA, the statute does not
stay this proceeding. Based on tl1e language of the statute, wl1ile its inte11t is to keep as many
tenants threatened witl1 eviction in t11eir homes while the CO VID-19 pandemic poses a danger to
the com1nunity, it plainly does not mean to stay an eviction proceeding against a tenant, such as
Respondent, who is facing removal from his home due to the dm1ger he allegedly poses to other
tenants at the building wl1ere he lives.
The general language i11 tl1e opening clause of Section 9 of CEEFPA, Part A, that states
the stays required by the statute upon a tenant's filing of a hardship declaration do not apply to
cases based on allegations of nuisance type behavior that affects other tenants, is not nullified by
the specific language in the statute as to how to proceed in cases in which a judgment has already
bee11 entered (CEEFPA, Part A,§ 9[2]). In light of the overall scheme of the statute, the specific
language for the _process to be followed in cases where, prior to CEEFPA's enactment, a
judgment has already been entered after a landlord l1as proven a cause of action related to a
tenant endangering otl1er tenants m1d occupants of a building serves to clarify that a hearing isrequired as to wl1ether allegations that the tenant is persisting in posing a danger to the other
reside11ts of the building have been "established." It is not meant to exclude cases where a tenant
is persistently acting in an objectionable manner, but a judgment has not yet been entered, from
the category of eviction proceedings that are exempt from the stays authorized by the statute.
The same type of adjudication that is required at a 11earing i11 an eviction proceeding that is postM
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judgment on the effective date of CEEFPA is req1tired to be made at trial in a case such this in
which a judgn1ent l1as not yet been entered. Trustees of Columbia University v. Grant, Civ Ct,
NY County, Jan 22, 2021, Schneider, J., L&T Index No. 62400/19.
The legal authority Respondent has cited in support of his position are inapplicable to the
circumstances of this proceeding. CG-N Affordable, LLC v. Bolshakov, 2021 NYLF LEXIS 202,
*5 (Civ Ct NY County) is readily distinguishable from the facts presented here in that affidavits
have been prese11ted from individttals with personal knowledge alleg,ing Respondent's
objectionable conduct has persisted. Also, Sch1vesinger v. Per/is, 2021 NY Slip Op 21043 (Civ
Ct NY County 2021) is inapplicable in that the procedural posture in tl1at case is different fron1
here. In Per/is, a judgment had been entered against tl1e tenant on December 14, 2020, prior to
the effective date of CEEFPA. Consequently, the procedure specifically outli11ed in CEEFPA
Part A, § 9(2) was required to be followed.
For these reasons, as stated above, CEEFPA does not stay this proceeding.
Respondent's motion is also denied to the extent it seeks an order staying the trial,
p1rrsuant to CPLR 2201, because it would be unjust to force Respo11dent into homelessness given
the public health crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Conducting a trial in this
proceeding does i1ot equate with forcing Respondent into homelessness. Certainly, it is possible
that after a trial the co11rt will rule Petitioner is entitled to a finaljudgn1ent of possession and to
evict Respondent. But it is also possible Petitioner will be u11able to prove t11eir petition or that
Respondent will prevail on one of his defenses. Further, the New York State legislature, in
enacting CEEFPA, has declared it to be the public policy of the state that the adjudication of
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eviction proceedings such as this, in which Respondent allegedly poses a danger to other
occupants of the building, should move forward despite the dangers posed by the pandemic.
For all the reasons stated above, Respondent's motion is denied except, absent an
amendment to the abovementioned memorandum directing that Housing Court trials be
conducted virtually at this time, the trial in this proceeding will be held virtually.
This proceeding is placed back on the court's calendar on June 1, 2021, from 3:30 p.m. to
4:30 p.m. for a pre-trial conference. The parties are required to appear before the court by
video/telephone conference. If needed, call 718-618-3566 or e-mail civbxhsvirtUal@nycourts.gov, prior to the court date, for information on how to appear by
video/telephone conference. If appearing by video/telephone conference is not possible you must
notify the court at 718-618-3566 at least 3 business days before June l, 202 l.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: Bronx, New York
May 10, 2021

:J ~L~
HON. HOW ARD BAUM,
J.H.C.

- Page 14 of 14 -

